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The purpose of this paper is to examine the land market behaviour in South Asia, taking 
the most technologically advanced Punjab (both Pakistan and India) as an example, and to 
consider the disparity issues in development. 
Land market in Punjab was given momentum when the private proprietorship of land 
was established in the middle of the 19th century. Land market behaviour in terms of the rent-
land price ratio or the profitability of investment in land cannot be explained by the 
conventional rent theory. Land price has never been the discounted value of rent. We try to 
explain the market behaviour by incorporating asset effects in addition to the technological 
effects in agricultural production. 
Since the land price data are not published after independence both in Pakistan and 
India, it is difficult to confirm whether or not the observed trend of declining rent-land price 
ratio can be observed after independence. However, judging from the scattered field survey 
data, we could presume that the asset effects have been positive and increasing, thereby 
reducing the R/P ratio much lower than the market interest rate. 
The study raises questions with respect to the direction of public investment, land tax 
policy, and the growing disparity between rent receivers and rent payers. 
 
I.   LAND MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB 
DURING THE BRITISH  PERIOD 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the land market behaviour in South Asia, 
taking Punjab both in Pakistan and India as an example and its implications on disparity 
issues. 
As discussed earlier [Hirashima (1978)], private proprietorship on land in Punjab 
was established at the early part of the British period. James Mill, father of J. S. Mill, 
who worked in India Office in London did not recommend the provision of private 
ownership of land to the peasants. He thought it would  be far easier for the Colonial 
government to collect revenue in the form of rent by making entire peasants as state 
tenants. He thought farmers should have enough incentive to work on land even after 
rent was taken by the state, since returns to capital, labour, and management were 
allowed to be retained by farmers. Instead, he apprehended the emergence of absentee 
landlords if a part of rent was allowed to be retained by farmers. Although his argument 
was not respected, his notion of rent was taken as a ceiling of the state demand. 
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Against Mill’s idea, the land revenue in Punjab was set at half the net produce 
followed after the Madras Settlement of 1885.  Since  the net produce was equivalent to 
rent in Mill’s definition, and it was approximately one-third of gross produce in practical 
terms, the Punjabi farmers could capture one-sixth of gross produce, otherwise to be 
taken as rent to the state, as a part of their income, which was called a “private rent  
property” at that  time. And it was this “private rent property” that gave commercial value 
to land and gave momentum to develop land market in Punjab. It is important to note that 
the state demand in real terms had decreased sharply since the revenue rate was fixed in 
nominal terms for 30 years (later 20 years); it become  as low as 1.5 percent  of gross 
produce on the eve of independence. Increasing “private rent property” simply meant the 
increasing commercial value of land, which stimulated land transactions throughout the 
British period. 
It is interesting to note that land market development was initiated by the Hindu 
money lenders in Punjab. Based on the profitability of money lending and grain 
marketing, they soon found out that the investment in land was equally or more profitable 
than the returns to their traditional occupations. As Malcolm Darling stated, the 
indebtedness among Punjabi farmers increased not because of their poverty, but because 
of their prosperity expressed in terms of asset (mortgage) value increase [Darling (1947)]. 
Participation of money lenders in the land market as well as the number of indebted 
farmers  increased. Apprehended the situation, Thorburn asserted the radical action to be 
taken against the money lenders participation in land market [Thorburn (1886)]. In 
response to the emerging situation, the Punjab government passed the well-known the 
Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 to prohibit the participations of non-farmers in land 
market.  
Observing the land market behaviour in terms of rent/land price ratio (hereafter 
R/P ratio) in Punjab since 1890 (Figure 1), we could raise the following questions. 
First, it is observed that the R/P ratio had been declining throughout the period 
under study. This trend cannot be explained by the conventional rent theory; land price is 
a discounted value of rent. Since rent in Figure 1 is one-third of gross produce which 
already incorporates technological innovations during the British period, the declining 
R/P ratio is influenced by some factors other than technology in agriculture. We 
temporary call it the asset effects which, as will be explained later, is the unexplained 
residuals of land price increase. 
Second, although the R/P ratio had declined over time, there are periods in which 
the ratio increased in the short-run. The short-run deviation from the long-run ratio needs 
to be explained. 
Third, admitting that the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 terminated the 
money lenders’ participation in land market, sharply declined profitability of investment 
in land as demonstrated by the R/P ratio (as compared with money lender’s interest rate) 
had already discouraged money lenders to be active in the land market well before 1900. 
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Fourth, observing the fact that land market had been active even after 1900 under 
the situation where the rate of return was less than the on-going interest rate, the main 
actors are presumed to be those who were well enough to invest in land without 
expecting short-run economic returns. 
 
2. LAND PRICE FORMATION IN THEORY 
AND REALITY 
Let us examine more in detail how land market in Punjab had behaved during the 
British period. Figure 1 shows the historical movement of R/P ratio during 1890–1940. 
Here, the rent is one-third of gross produce which was the state demand during the 
British period and it was later found to be identical with the theoretical rent or marginal 
productivity of land [Hirashima (1978)] 
Now, let us specify our basic model of land price formation. Assuming a given 
level of technology and a permanent nature of land (no depreciation), land price can be 
expressed as follows. 
P = R/r + V … … … … … … (1a) 
Fig. 1. Movement of Rent-land Price Ratio in the Undivided 
Punjab (1890–1940) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  From Appendix. 
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where, P=land price,  R=rent,  V= Asset effects,  r = rate of return. 
R/P = r–r V/P … … … … … … (1b) 
where, R/P ≥ r, if V ≥ 0 and R/P = r, if V = 0 
This is our basic long-run model. The important point here is the inclusion of the 
asset effects in the model. The conventional rent theory assumes zero value  of V, which 
implies that the land price  is always a discounted value of rent. However, the actual 
movement of R/P ratio in Punjab demonstrates clearly that the ratio had been declining 
over time. This means that V had been positive and increasing, since, as already 
mentioned, the rent (R)  in Figure 1 incorporates technological innovation during the 
British period. 
As is observed in Figure 1, there are period  in which the R/P ratio increased. We 
presume this short-run movement as a result of technological change. We could 
illustrate the long-run and short-run R/P ratios as in Figure 2. With respect to the 
movement of short-run R/P ratio, we could specify two cases; transit nature of 
technological change, and the sustained one. 
 
If we presume the technological change occurs unexpectedly and has a transit in 
nature, the following formulation is conceived. 
Rt = R0 + et … … … … … … (2a) 
where, e = unexpected increase due to technological change R0 = the rent without 
technological change. Then we have, 
Pt = Vt + R0 /r + et  … … … … … (2b) 
since Rt = R0 + et, we can rewrite (2b) as, 
Fig. 2.  Long-run and Short-run Movement of R/P Ratio. 
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Pt = Vt + R0 /r + et/r + et = Vt + Rt /r– (1 – r) et /r 
Rt /Pt = r – rVt /Pt + (1–r) et /Pt … … … … (2c) 
if V = 0, the Rt /Pt = r+(1–r) et /Pt > r 
The Equation (2c) shows the increasing phase in the short-run model. Next, we 
have to consider the case where technological change is expected and sustained. We 
could specify the model as follows. 
Rt = R0 (1+a) a< r … … … … … … (3a) 
where, R0 = the rent without technological innovation, and a=the rate at which 
rent is increasing with technological change. Then we obtain the following relationships. 
Pt = Vt + Rt / (r – a) … … … … … (3b) 
Rt /Pt = (r–a) – (r–a) Vt /Pt < r … … … … (3c) 
The Equation (3c) shows, the expected and sustained technological change 
pushes the R/P ratio lower than r, if V=0. However, it suggests also that the ratio 
becomes much lower if V is positive and increasing. As we pointed out earlier, our R in 
Figure 1 already incorporates technological change that took place during the British 
period in Punjab, which gives us evidence of a positive and increasing V during the 
period under study. In fact, the land price in real terms had been increasing much faster 
than the agricultural productivity increase during the British period [Hirashima (1978)]. 
The recent study by Renkow also shows that the increase in land price cannot be 
explained solely by the technological innovation in the post independent Pakistan 
Punjab, and that the rent  had increased faster than the land price during the Green 
Revolution period (1976–86) [ Renkow (1991)]. 
 
3. BEHAVIOUR OF LAND MARKET IN PUNJAB: 
POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD 
 
1.  Evidence from Pakistan Punjab 
Land price data have not been published both in Pakistan and India after 
independence. Therefore, it is difficult to examine whether the behaviour of land market 
during the post independence period is identical to the one we have just examined for the 
British period or not. There is no other way but to resort to the field survey data in 
villages. 
Two sets of field survey data are available for the Pakistan Punjab. One is the 
data collected by the author in 1971-72 from four villages [Hirashima (1978)], and the 
other by Renkow for the period 1968–89 [Renkow  (1991)]. 
S. Hirashima 968
According to the former study, the average R/P ratio came to be 4.1 percent  in 
the case of rent in kind, and 3.5 percent  in cash rent. The ratio based on the shadow 
price of land (marginal productivity of land) was 5.3 percent (Table 1). It has to be noted 
that these ratios are ones in the midst of the green revolution in Pakistan Punjab, which 
might have pushed the short-run R/P ratio somewhat upward. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that these ratios are more or less in line with the R/P ratios we observed during 
the British period. 
 
Table 1 
Rent-land Price Ratios: Pakistan Punjab (1971-72) 
  
Rent, Land 
Price 
 
Rent-land Price 
Ratio (%) 
Rent-
productivity 
Ratio (%) 
Average Land Price (Rs/Acre) 4,685 – – 
Average Gross Revenue (Rs/Acre) 689 – – 
Average Rent in Kind (Rs/Acre) 242 5.17 35.1 
Average Rent in Cash (Rs/Acre) 152 3.24 22.1 
Estimated Rent: Theoretical Value 
(Rs/Acre) 
 
230 4.91 33.4 
Source:  Hirashima (1978) op. cit. Table 32 (Reconstructed). 
Note:     Pooled data of 4 villages in Pakistan Punjab; 3 in rice growing region and 1 in cotton growing region. 
All villages are irrigated; 2 by perennial canals and tube-wells, 1 by non-perennial canal and tube-
wells, and one exclusively by tube-wells. 
 
Another study by Renkow covers the period 1960–89. In this study, the land 
price data were collected from 37 irrigated villages and 42 rainfed villages in the 
Pakistan Punjab which were away from the urban centres in order to avoid urban 
influence.  However, data on rent were not collected from the surveyed villages, but 
borrowed from the PERI (Punjab Economic Research Institute) data collected in other 
villages. Therefore, the R/P ratios are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, it is 
sufficiently suggestive. The study shows that the R/P ratio in the rainfed villages had 
declined from 2.85 percent in 1960 to 1.98 percent in 1989, and from 3.93 percent to 
2.59 percent in the irrigated villages (Table 2). 
The study confirms the faster increase of land price than rent in general, and the 
faster increase of rent than land price during the green revolution period (1976–86). The 
study also found out that the 70 percent of the incremental portion of land price was 
explained by the technological innovation, and that the disparity between rainfed and 
irrigated villages has been narrowed mainly due to the influence of remittance money 
from the oil producing  counties in the rainfed villages. 
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Table 2 
Trends of Rent-land Price Ratios: Indian Punjab (1971-72–1987-88) 
 Region I Region II Region III State 
<1971-72>     
Average Rent (Rs/ha) 902 985 810 903 
Average Land Price (Rs/ha) 25,444 29,914 17,548 24,310 
Rent-land Price Ratio (%) 3.55 3.29 4.62 3.71 
Rent-productivity Ratio (%) 34.2 34.8 34.3 34.5 
<1987-88>     
Average Rent (Rs/ha) 3,142 4,661 3,074 3,882 
Average Land Price (Rs/ha) 100,585 145,158 88,878 119,360 
Rent-land Price Ratio (%) 3.12 3.21 3.46 3.25 
Rent-productivity Ratio (%) 28.6 24.6 18.9 23.5 
Source:  Restructured from Singh et al. (1991). 
Note: Region I: Sample household (48 in 1971-72, 48 in 1987-88). Northeastern districts, including 
Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur and Ropar. High rainfall. Medium irrigation facilities. Sub 
mountainous tract. 
 Region II: Sample household (91 in 1971-72, 112 in 1987-88). Central districts including Amritsar, 
Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Patiala and Sangur. Medium rainfall. Good irrigation facilities. 
 Region III: Sample Household (77 in 1971-72, 66 in 1987-88). Southwestern district including 
Bathinda, Ferozpur and Farid Kot. Low rainfall. Canal irrigated. Unsuitable for Tube-well. 
 
Although, there are some problems in data collection, and it does not give any 
importance to the level of R/P ratio (much below market interest rate), it provides us 
with supportive evidence with respect to the positive and increasing V in our model. 
 
2.  Evidence from Indian Punjab 
We have two sets of data  from Indian Punjab to examine the R/P ratio in the  
way we did for Pakistan Punjab. One study covers the two periods (1971-72 and 1987-
88) and the other for the most recent period between 1990–95. 
In the former study, Punjab was divided into three homogeneous regions based 
on crop, climate and other factors [Singh, Bal and Kumar (1991)]. Table 3 shows the 
R/P ratios in three regions in two period of time. It was found out, first that the R/P 
ratios had declined in all cases; 3.55 percent to 3.12 percent in Region I, from 3.29 
percent to 3.21 percent  in Region II, and from 3.71 percent to 3.25 percent in Region 
III. Second, the rent of the most productive region (Region II) increased faster. Third, in 
all cases, the rent/gross produce ratios had declined. It is presumed that the marginal 
decline of the R/P ratios in three regions is attributable to the slower land price increase 
during the politically uncertain situation prevalent in 1987-88 in the Indian Punjab. 
Inspite of these constraints, the study provides us with supportive evidence to our propositions. 
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Table 3 
Trend of Rent-land Price Ratios: Pakistan Punjab (1960–89) 
 Rainfed Area Irrigated Rice-Wheat Zone 
Pre-Green Revolution (1960–70)   
Average Rent (Rs/ha) 410 1,730 
Average Land Price (Rs/ha) 14,400 44,000 
Rent-land Price Ratio (%) 2.85 3.93 
Green Revolution (1968–75)   
Average Rent (Rs/ha) 564 1,830 
Average Land Price (Rs/ha) 24,800 76,700 
Rent-land Price Ratio (%) 2.27 2.39 
Post Green Revolution (1976–85)   
Average Rent (Rs/ha) 757 2,850 
Average Land Price (Rs/ha) 34,400 85,500 
Rent-land Price Ratio (%) 2.20 3.33 
Post-Green Revolution (1986–89)   
Average Rent (Rs/ha) 1,160 3,080 
Average Land Price (Rs/ha) 58,600 119,000 
Rent-land Price Ratio (%) 1.92 2.59 
Trend Growth Rate (1960–89)   
Rent Price (%) 4.1 3.1 
Land Price (%) 5.7 4.4 
Trend Growth Rate (1976–89)   
Rent (%) 4.6 3.0 
Land Price (%) 10.4 5.9 
Source:  Renkow (1991), (slightly modified). 
 
The second set of data covers the most recent period (1990–95) and both rent as 
well as land price were collected from 287 plots of land in four villages in Ludhiana, 
Punjab by the author with the help of IEG (Institute of Economic Growth). As indicated 
from Table 4, it is shown that the R/P ratio has gone down as low as 0.6 percent  in the 
village closer to Ludhiana Town. This evidence suggests that the closeness to the 
commercial and industrial centre and the accumulation of social overhead capital of the 
region seem to have more influence on R/P ratio than the technological innovation has on 
rent through agricultural productivity increase. 
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Table 4 
Trends of Rent-land Price Ratios: Ludhiana, India (1990–95) 
Number of Farm Households 
Rent-land Price Ratio Village A Village B Village C Village D 
% 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 
–2.0 0 54 0 3 1 19 23 73 
2.1–3.0 15 17 9 55 4 56 7 0 
3.1–4.0 34 0 30 10 37 0 21 0 
4.1–5.0 20 0 26 0 12 0 18 0 
5.1– 2 0 3 0 21 0 4 0 
Total 71 71 68 68 75 75 73 73 
Average Rent (Rs/Acre) 4,707 8,250 4,842 8,408 4,484 7,456 4,134 7,358 
Average Land Price 
(Rs/Acre) 
 
131,690 448,028 125,441 317,647 111,733 341,733 266,917
 
1,223,287 
Average Rent-land 
   Price Ratio 
 
3.57 1.84 3.86 2.65 4.01 2.18 1.54
 
0.60 
Source:  Field Survey Data collected from 287 plots in four villages in Ludhiana, India. These villages were 
surveyed originally by Dr Ramesh Chand of Institute of Economic Growth in 1993. Data on land price 
and rent were additionally collected by him on the Author’s request in 1995. 
Note: Village A: 16 Km from Ludhiana town. 2 Km from Ludhiana–Pakhowal main road connected by link 
road. 
 Village B: 23 Km from Ludhiana town. 19 Km by Ludhiana-Pakhowal main road and 4 Km by link 
road. 
 Village C: 19 Km from Ludhiana town. 14 Km by Ludhiana-Ferozpur Highway and 5 Km by link 
road. 
 Village D: 8 Km from Ludhiana town. Located along the Ludhiana-Pakhowal main road. 
 
4.  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The analysis so far made can be summarised as follows. 
First, throughout the British period, the R/P ratio had been declining. The 
movement of the ratio even after the post independence period can be regarded as an 
extension of the one observed during the pre-independence period. 
Second, our analysis confirms the fact that land price has not been the discounted 
value of rent as the conventional rent theory asserts. The recognition as well as 
understandings of the asset effects, V in our notation, in land price formation seems to 
be crucial. The magnitude of the asset effects is hypothesised as a function of the 
accumulation of social over-head capital  and the private capital formation of the non-
agricultural sectors in the region. And highly likely that the asset effects would be much 
stronger in land price formation than the technological effects in agricultural production 
at least in the long-run. 
Third, if this argument is valid, it can further be hypothesised that the disparity 
between the rent payers and rent receivers, and even among rent receivers with different 
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land ownership, and the disparity between  regions with different accumulation of public 
and private capital may not be reduced only with technological innovation within the 
agricultural sector through market. 
Fourth, the R/P ratio in contemporary Punjab has gone down to the extent that it 
is no more possible to  buy land for those who do not have initial capital. It follows, 
therefore, that only those who can afford to wait for the V effects be captured in the 
long-run, without expecting much return in the short-run, can participate in land market. 
In this situation, the income from the outside sector seems to be the only means for the 
small and marginal farmers or landless non-farm households in villages in Punjab to 
participate in land market. 
Fifth, with respect to the policy implication of our findings, the following four 
points may be relevant. First, it is important to recognise that the disparity question 
cannot be answered neither in flow terms (income), nor stock terms (asset) alone, but in 
the dynamic relationship between the two. Second, one of the key areas for reducing 
disparity is the pattern and direction of public investment in social overhead capital in 
the region. Therefore, public investment should be redirected, if necessary, to minimise 
the growing disparity among regions. Third, it seems to be important to prevent the 
capital gain from land holding  to grow by introducing appropriate land tax policy. 
Fourth, the effort has to be made to collect land price data systematically and make them 
accessible to the public. 
 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 
Trends of Rent-land Price Ratios: Undivided Indian Punjab (1891–1940) 
 
Year 
Land Price 
(PL) 
Rent 
(R) 
R/PL 
(%) 
 
Year 
Land Price 
(PL) 
Rent 
(R) 
R/PL 
(%) 
 
Year 
Land Price 
(PL) 
Rent 
(R) 
R/PL 
(%) 
1891 63 10.5 16.6 1911 123 13.6 11.1 1931 412 13.1 3.2 
1892 66 11.6 17.6 1912 107 12.9 12.1 1932 372 13.2 3.5 
1893 69 12.2 17.7 1913 249 13.7 5.5 1933 477 12.7 2.7 
1894 70 11.8 16.4 1914 180 13.3 7.4 1934 389 16.1 4.1 
1895 75 11.8 15.8 1915 216 10.9 5.0 1935 404 14.9 3.7 
1896 78 12.9 16.5 1916 227 11.8 5.2 1936 409 17.0 4.2 
1897 81 11.8 14.6 1917 252 12.7 5.0 1937 340 15.3 4.5 
1898 83 10.9 13.1 1918 184 13.9 7.5 1938 451 14.3 3.2 
1899 81 13.0 16.0 1919 275 14.5 5.3 1939 436 16.0 3.7 
1900 83 11.8 14.2 1920 345 12.0 3.5 1940 466 15.4 3.3 
1901 71 11.5 16.1 1921 385 14.1 3.7     
1902 71 12.7 17.8 1922 314 14.2 4.5     
1903 85 15.0 17.6 1923 383 14.9 3.9     
1904 85 14.1 16.4 1924 438 12.7 3.0     
1905 85 14.7 17.3 1925 477 13.5 2.8     
1906 103 13.2 12.8 1926 368 13.4 3.6     
1907 101 11.6 11.5 1927 402 12.3 3.0     
1908 114 12.9 11.3 1928 372 11.9 3.2     
1909 121 14.1 11.6 1929 406 14.2 3.5     
1910 129 13.9 10.7 1930 420 13.9 3.3     
Source:  Hirashima (1978). 
S. Hirashima 974
REFERENCES 
Darling, Malcolm (1947) The Punjab Peasants in Prosperity and Debt. (The Fourth 
Edition). Oxford University Press. 
Hirashima, S. (1978) The Structure of Disparity in Developing Agriculture: A Case 
Study of the Pakistan Punjab. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. 
Renkow, Mitch (1991) Land Price, Land Rents, and Technological Change: Evidence 
from Pakistan. Mexico: CIMMYT (Economic Working Paper 90/01). 
Singh, Bant, H. S. Bal and Narinder Kumar (1991) A Spatio-temporal Analysis of 
Land-lease Market in Punjab. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics 46:3. 
Thorburn, S. S. (1886) Musalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab. London: William 
Blackwood and Sons. 
  
 
Comments  
 
There is a general dearth of studies exploring land market developments in the 
less developed countries, especially in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Professor 
Hirashima’s study can, therefore, be regarded as a pioneering work. As such there is a 
general lack of data on land rents and land prices, the time-series data on these variables 
from 1891 to date reported in the study fills this data-gap and allows further studies on 
the topic. Apart from this implicit contribution of the paper, many of paper’s conclusions 
may be explicitly  stated as having further implications for a possible recourse to policy 
and agricultural development as follows: 
Firstly, the paper refutes the old theory of land rent which holds that land price is 
a discounted value of rent. 
Secondly and more importantly, it argues that land prices are a function of 
accumulated capital (social or physical) in the public and private sectors and that asset 
effect would be stronger than technological effect in land price formation. 
Thirdly and given the above argument, it can be hypothesised that disparity 
between rent payers and rent receivers, even among rent  receivers and between regions 
with different endowments of overhead social capital cannot be reduced with  
technological innovations alone but should mainly be pursued with redirection of public 
investment. 
Finally, under the falling rent-price ratios of land it has become increasingly 
difficult for the small and marginal farmers or the landless to participate in the land 
market without access to incomes  from non-farm sources. In order to ensure widespread 
participation in the land market, the need for an appropriate land tax policy can hardly be 
underestimated as such a policy is most likely to dampen land price increases and 
excessive land capitalisation. 
While I am in general agreement with the above conclusions, I have some minor 
differences with certain aspects of the underlying arguments. 
The paper uses the falling rent-price ratio to refute the traditional theory of rent 
and perhaps has a justification to do so. It, however, is not clear if the falling ratio was 
the outcome of capital formation, technological changes or even growing population 
pressure on land. The paper assumes, that it was capital formation more than any other 
factor. As the paper develops no empirical relationship between the dependent and 
possible explanatory variables, simply assuming that capital formation outside the 
agricultural sector was important in determining rent-price ratios, would not be enough. 
There is no dearth of literature on Pakistan’s Green Revolution as to its 
beginning, its impact on land rent and prices and its implications for income distribution. 
On the basis of available literature, Green Revolution seem to have made a beginning in 
Pakistan in the early 1960s and matured in the late Sixties and early Seventies. On this 
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account, the periods before 1960s, between 1960 and 1975 and after 1975 should 
respectively correspond with Pre-Green Revolution, Green Revolution and Post-Green 
Revolution periods. I have problem agreeing with Professor Hirashima who defined 
1960–67 as Pre-Green Revolution, 1968–75 as Green Revolution and 1976–89 as Post-
Green Revolution periods. In fact, the evolution of new HYVs of cotton would demand 
that the period since 1984-85 be regarded as another period  of Green Revolution in 
Pakistan. Likewise most of the literature on Green Revolution has postulated the effects 
of technology on land rents and land prices and it would be difficult to disregard 
technology as a factor in rent-price ratios. While rents in general are  charged on the 
basis of actual productivity gains, and land prices may change also in anticipation of 
future technological  developments, the outcome  would be the falling rent-price ratios. 
Although social infrastructure may be a factor in class and regional disparities, Green 
Revolution has been no less important in this respect, can be substantiated by world-
wide evidence. 
In view of the sharp increase in land prices, I completely agree with Professor 
Hirashima’s conclusion that active   involvement of small and marginal farmers and the 
landless in land markets has become a rising impossibility without incomes from outside 
of agriculture. There can also be little disagreement regarding the proposal of 
appropriate taxation of agriculture for checking rapidly rising land prices and excessive 
land capitalisation. 
 
M. Ghaffar Chaudhry 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
Islamabad. 
 
 
